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A few more days passed.
Reports from the countryside became more alarming. Then one day
Usama, who feared for Madinah and for Islam no less than the others,
spoke to Umar. "Go to the Caliph", he said. "Ask
him to permit the army to remain at Madinah. All the leaders of
the community are with me. If we go, none will be left to prevent
the infidels from tearing Madinah to pieces."
Umar agreed to speak to the Caliph. As he
was leaving the camp, he was met by a group of leaders who made
the same suggestion and added: "If he does not agree to
our remaining in Madinah and we have to go, ask him at least to
place an older man than Usama in command of the army."
1 Umar agreed to put this across also.
In Madinah Abu Bakr sat on the floor of
his house, getting used to the tremendous burden which the assumption
of the caliphate in these stormy days had placed upon his shoulders.
The strain would have shattered his nerves but for his limitless
faith. Umar entered. Umar was calm and confident, for he was used
to speaking to Abu Bakr as a strong, vigorous man would address
a mild and submissive, albeit beloved comrade.
Abu Bakr waited until Umar had delivered
the message and also expressed his own opinion regarding the proposed
change of command. Then he leapt to his feet and shouted at Umar,
"O Son of Al Khattab! It was the Messenger of Allah who
appointed Usama as the commander. And you want me to remove
him from command." 2
Umar hastily backed out of Abu Bakr's house.
He returned to the camp where the elders waited to see what news
he would bring. Umar abused them roundly! 3
On June 24, 632 (the 1st of Rabi-ul-Akhir,
11 Hijri), the Army of Usama broke camp and moved out. Abu Bakr
walked some distance beside the mounted Usama and refused to let
the young commander dismount from his horse. "Every step
that a Muslim warrior takes in the way of Allah", he explained
to Usama, "earns him the merit of 700 good deeds and the
forgiveness of 700 sins." 4
Abu Bakr asked if he could retain Umar with
him as adviser, to which Usama readily agreed. Then he gave his
parting instructions to the Army Commander: "Carry out your
task. Start the operation with raids against the Quza'a. Let nothing
deter you from accomplishing the mission given you by the Messenger
of Allah." 5 And the Army of Usama
marched away.
The despatch of the Army of Usama was a
mistake in the circumstances which had arisen since the Prophet's
death.6 Some Muslim writers have stated
that it was a wise move on the part of Abu Bakr, as it gave a show
of strength to the rebels and thus deterred them from greater violence.
Actually, this was not the case. Although Usama carried out his
mission with efficiency and speed, his operation had no bearing
whatever on the major actions of the apostasy which were fought
in North-Central Arabia. The despatch of the Army of Usama was an
act of faith displaying complete submission to the will of the departed
Prophet, but as a manoeuvre of military and political strategy,
it was anything but sound. This is also proven by the fact that
all the Muslim leaders were opposed to the move-leaders who produced,
in this and the following decades, some of the finest generals of
history.
Abu Bakr was moved to this decision by nothing
other than his desire to carry out the last military wish of the
Prophet. It was not lack of strategical judgement which led him
to send of the Army of Usama, for Abu Bakr had ample military ability,
as he was to prove soon after in his direction and conduct of the
war against the apostates and the invasions of Iraq and Syria.
The Army of Usama was gone. Reports of ever-spreading
revolt and of the concentration of hostile tribes became more serious
day by day. The apprehensions of the Muslims increased. In contrast,
the apostates rejoiced at the news of Abu Bakr's assumption of the
caliphate and the departure of the army. With Abu Bakr at the helm
of Muslim affairs, they thought, their objective of crushing the
new Muslim State would be more easily achieved. The rebels were
relieved that they did not have to deal with the fiery Umar or the
peerless Ali. They would only have to deal with a nice old man!
But the Muslims were in for some pleasant
surprises and the apostates for some rude shocks at the hands of
'the nice old, man'-such shocks that one rebel chieftain, fleeing
from the columns of Abu Bakr, would cry in terror: "Woe
to the Arabs from the son of Abu Quhafa!" 7
1. Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 462.
2. Ibid: Vol. 2, P. 462.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid: Vol. 2, p. 463.
6. Only a purely material perspective could
regard this as a mistake, and even then this statement is difficult
to defend categorically. It could easily be argued that the astonishing
victories against the apostates, Persians and Romans during Abu
Bakr's short caliphate were partly from the blessing of this decision
to continue a matter begun by the Prophet (SAWS), one of the first
major decisions made by Abu Bakr as caliph.
7. Balazuri: p. 104.
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