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Some time in the middle
of Rabi-ul-Awwal (third week of May), the Caliph received a message
from Abu Ubaidah giving a fairly clear picture of the situation
in Syria and Palestine. Muslim estimates suggested that presently
the Romans would have an army of 100,000 men at Ajnadein, from where
it could either strike frontally against Amr bin Al Aas, or manoeuvre
against the flanks and rear of the other three Muslim corps. This
estimate of Roman strength was not far from the mark, as we shall
see later.
The situation had taken a turn for the worse.
The Romans were in much larger strength than had been anticipated
by the Muslims when the invasion was launched; and it was clear
that the Romans were not going to sit in their fortified cities
and await attack. They were concentrating into one great army to
fight a grand offensive battle in the field. The Muslims would either
have to fight a general set-piece battle with the Imperial Roman
Army or withdraw hastily into Arabia, neither of which alternatives
was pleasant to contemplate. The Caliph rejected the second one
outright. There was no question of returning to Arabia in face of
the Roman threat. The invasion of Syria had been launched; it must
be sustained. But what caused Abu Bakr the greatest anxiety was
the question of who should command the Muslim army? Abu Bakr had
ordered that Abu Ubaidah would take command of the army whenever
the corps were united for battle. Abu Ubaidah was a wise, intelligent
man, and a widely esteemed and venerated Muslim. He was also a man
of unquestionable personal courage. But knowing his mild and gentle
nature and his lack of experience in the command of military forces
in major operations, Abu Bakr had serious misgivings about his ability
to lead the entire Muslim army in a serious clash with the powerful
and sophisticated army of Eastern Rome.
Abu Bakr reached the best conclusion which
was possible under the circumstances: he would send Khalid bin Al
Waleed to command the Muslim army in Syria! Khalid had recently
shattered the Persian army in several bloody battles. Khalid would
know what to do. This decision made Abu Bakr feel lighter, as if
a heavy burden had been lifted off his shoulders. "By Allah,"
he said, "I shall destroy the Romans and the friends of
Satan with Khalid bin Al Waleed!" 1
He consequently despatched a fast rider to Hira with instructions
for Khalid to move with half his army to Syria, take command of
the Muslim forces and fight the Romans.
The next chapter takes up the thread of
events which constituted Khalid's conquest of Syria. This subject
is taken up with the full realization of the possibility of error
in the account of this campaign, because of the confusion and the
contradictions that exist in the narratives of the early historians.
There is disagreement about many important aspects of this military
history-in the dates of the great battles; in the strengths of the
forces deployed in these battles, in the order in which these battles
were fought; even, in the case of the odd battle, about who commanded
the army at the time. The only writer who has described the campaign
in meticulous detail is Waqidi; but his account also contains errors,
as it is based on narratives passed down orally from the Syrian
veterans, which sometimes conflict.
In this book has been prepared, from all
the accounts available, a sequence of events and a version of these
events which makes the most military sense and leaves the least
room for contradiction. The reader has been spared copious footnotes,
explaining each alternative version and each deviation from the
commonly accepted version of this campaign; but he will find footnotes
in the case of the more important issues, so that he may form his
own opinion. And Allah knows best!
1. Tabari: Vol. 2, p. 603.
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