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The following day Abu Bakr
set out from Madinah with a long string of pack camels, for the
riding camels had all gone with Usama and these inferior camels
were the best that Abu Bakr could muster in the way of transportation.
As the convoy got to the abandoned apostate camp, the Muslims who
had driven the apostates away mounted these camels and the force
advanced towards Zhu Hussa-the apostate base.
Here the enemy waited, and Hibal, the brother
of Tulaiha, showed his military cunning. He kept his men behind
the crest of a slope, some distance ahead of the base towards which
the Muslims were advancing.
The Muslims, mounted on their pack camels,
rode up the slope unaware of the enemy who waited just beyond the
crest. When the unsuspecting Muslims got near the crest, the apostates
stood up and hurled upon the forward slope a countless number of
goatskins filled with water. As these goatskins rolled down the
crest towards the Muslims, a wild din arose from the apostate ranks
as they hammered on drums and screamed at the top of their voices.
The pack camels, untrained for battle and not used to sudden loud
noises or the sight of unfamiliar objects rolling towards them in
large numbers, turned and bolted. The Muslims did their utmost to
control their panic-stricken mounts but failed, and very soon the
entire Muslim force was home again!
Hibal had reason to feel pleased with himself.
He had pulled a fast one on the Muslims and driven them back to
Madinah without, so to speak, firing a shot. In view of this clever
trick which Hibal pulled off, it is possible that the preceding
apostate withdrawal had been a feint, planned by Hibal, to draw
the Muslims out of the security of their town towards Zhu Hussa.
We do not know. But Hibal now made the mistake of assuming that
the Muslims were frightened, and that their hasty move back to Madinah
was a sign of weakness. He did not know that the Muslims were mounted
on pack camels, and that it was these animals that had panicked
and not the men who rode them. The part of his force that had remained
at Zhu Qissa was informed of this success and called forward. The
same evening the full force of the apostates advanced and re?established
the camp near Madinah, from which they had withdrawn only the day
before. The spirits of the apostates were high.
The Muslims, on the other hand, were very
angry, and every man was determined to set the record straight in
a return engagement. Abu Bakr knew that the apostates had returned
to their camp near Madinah, and decided to assail them before they
could complete their preparations for battle. Under his instructions,
the Muslims spent most of the night reorganising their small army
and preparing for battle.
During the latter part of the night Abu
Bakr led his army out of Madinah and formed up for the assault.
He deployed the army with a centre, two wings and a rear guard.
Keeping the centre under his direct command, he placed the right
wing under Numan, the left wing under Abdullah and the rearguard
under Suwaid-all three of whom were sons of Muqaran. Before dawn
the army was set in motion towards the enemy camp where the apostates,
confident of an easy victory on the morrow, slept soundly.
This time it was Hibal who was surprised.
The first glow of dawn had not yet appeared when a furious, screaming
mass of Muslims fell upon the camp with drawn swords. The apostates
did not stand upon the order of their going. Many were killed, but
most of them found safety in flight, and did not stop until they
had got to Zhu Qissa, where they paused to rest and reorganise.
Their spirits were no longer so high.
This round had been won by Abu Bakr, and
his was no empty success. It was a bloody tactical action in which
the enemy had been driven back by the sword and not by deception
alone. Abu Bakr had decided to catch the enemy unawares and thus
get the benefit of surprise to offset his numerical inferiority,
and in this he had succeeded. He needed quick tactical victory and
he had got it. As a matter of interest it may be noted that this
is the first instance in Muslim history of a night attack-a tactical
method which did not achieve popularity until the First World War.
Having won this round, Abu Bakr decided
to give no respite to his opponents. He would catch them before
the effect of the shock wore off and while alarm and confusion kept
them disorganised. As the sun rose, he marched to Zhu Qissa.
On arrival at Zhu Qissa, he formed up for
battle as he had done the night before, and then launched his attack.
The apostates put up a fight, but their morale was low and after
some resistance they broke contact and retreated to Abraq where
more clansmen of the Ghatfan, the Hawazin and the Tayy were gathered.
Abu Bakr, on capturing Zhu Qissa, sent a small force under Talha
bin Ubaidullah to pursue the enemy. Talha advanced a short distance
and killed some stragglers, but the small size of his force prevented
him from doing any great damage to the retreating apostates.
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